Appendix

A. Related work

Many defenses have been proposed to make neural networks robust against adversarial examples. These methods can be classified into empirical defenses which empirically seem to be robust against known adversarial attacks, and certified defenses, which are provably robust against such attacks.

**Empirical defenses** The best known empirical defense is adversarial training (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019b). In this method, a neural network is trained to minimize the worst-case loss over a region around the input. Although such defenses seem to work on existing attacks, there is no guarantee that a more powerful attack would not break them. In fact, most such defenses proposed in the literature were later broken by stronger attacks (Athalye & Carlini, 2018; Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Uesato et al., 2018). To end this arms race between defenses and attacks, a number of works have tried to focus on certified defenses that have formal robustness guarantees.

**Certified defenses** A classifier is said to be certifiably robust if one can easily obtain a guarantee that a classifier’s prediction remains constant within some region around the input. Such defenses typically rely on certification methods which are either exact or conservative. Exact methods report whether or not there exists a adversarial perturbation inside some $l_p$ norm ball. In contrast, conservative methods either certify that no adversarial perturbation exists or decline to make a certification; they may decline even when no such perturbation exists. Exact methods are usually based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (Carlini et al., 2017; Ehlers, 2017; Huang et al., 2016; Katz et al., 2017) and Mixed Integer linear programming (Bunel et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2017; Dutta et al., 2018; Fischetti & Jo, 2018; Lomuscio & Maganti, 2017). Unfortunately, they are computationally inefficient and difficult to scale up to even moderately sized neural networks. In contrast, conservative methods are more scalable and efficient which makes them useful for building certified defenses (Croce et al., 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018a; Gehr et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Singh et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018a; Weng et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2017; Wong et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018b). However, even these methods have not been shown to scale to practical networks that are large and expressive enough to perform well on ImageNet, for example. To scale to such large networks, randomized smoothing has been proposed as a probabilistically certified defense.

**Randomized smoothing** Randomized smoothing was previously proposed by several works (Cao & Gong, 2017; Liu et al., 2017) as a empirical defense without any formal guarantees. (Lécuyer et al., 2018) first proved robustness guarantees for randomized smoothing classifier using inequalities from differential privacy. (Li et al., 2018) improved upon the same using tools from information theory. Recently, (Cohen et al., 2019) provided a even tighter robustness guarantee for randomized smoothing. (Salman et al., 2019) proposed a method of adversarial training for the randomized smoothing classifier giving state of the art results in the $l_2$ norm metric.

B. The Attack problem

For a given input $x^{(0)}$ with true label $y$ and attack target $t$, consider the attack problem. We are given that the eigenvalues of the Hessian $\nabla_x^2(z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t)$ are bounded below i.e:

$$mI \leq \nabla_x^2(z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t) \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D$$

Here $m < 0$ (since $z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t$ is not convex in general).

The goal here is to find an adversarial example inside a $l_2$ ball of radius $\rho$ such that $(z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t)(x)$ is minimized. That is, we want to solve the following optimization:

$$p_{\text{attack}}^* = \min_{\|x-x^{(0)}\|\leq \rho} \left( z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t \right)(x)$$

$$= \min_{x} \max_{\eta \geq 0} \left[ \left( z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t \right)(x) + \frac{\eta}{2} \left( \|x-x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right) \right]$$

(1)

This optimization can be hard in general. Using the max-min inequality (primal $\geq$ dual), we have:

$$p_{\text{attack}}^* \geq \max_{\eta \geq 0} d_{\text{attack}}(\eta)$$

$$d_{\text{attack}}(\eta) = \min_{x} \left[ \left( z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t \right)(x) + \frac{\eta}{2} \left( \|x-x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right) \right]$$

(2)
We know that for every \( \eta \geq 0 \), \( d_{\text{attack}}(\eta) \) gives a lower bound to the primal solution \( p_{\text{attack}}^* \). But solving \( d_{\text{attack}}(\eta) \) for any \( \eta \geq 0 \) can be hard unless the objective is convex. We prove that if the eigenvalues of the Hessian are bounded below i.e:
\[
mI \leq \nabla^2_x \left( z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)} \right) \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]
In general \( m < 0 \), since \( (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)}) \) is non-convex.
\( d_{\text{attack}}(\eta) \) is a convex optimization problem for \(-m \leq \eta \).
Equivalently the objective function, i.e the function inside the min:
\[
\left[ (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)})(x) + \frac{\eta}{2} \left( \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right) \right]
\]
is a convex function in \( x \) for \(-m \leq \eta \).

The Hessian of the above function is given by:
\[
\nabla^2_x \left( z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)} \right) + \eta I
\]
Since we know that eigenvalues of \( \nabla^2_x (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)}) \geq mI \), we know that eigenvalues of the above Hessian are \( \geq \eta + m \).
For \( \eta - m \), the eigenvalues are positive implying that the objective function is convex.
Since \( d_{\text{attack}}(\eta) \) gives a lower bound to \( p_{\text{attack}}^* \) for every \( \eta \geq 0 \), we get the following result:
\[
p_{\text{attack}}^* \geq d_{\text{attack}}^* \quad \text{where} \quad d_{\text{attack}}^* = \max_{-m \leq \eta \leq 0} d_{\text{attack}}(\eta) \quad (3)
\]
Note that if \( x^{(\text{attack})} \) is the solution to \( d_{\text{attack}}^* \) such that:
\[
\|x^{(\text{attack})} - x^{(0)}\| = \rho,
\]
by the definition of \( d_{\text{attack}}^* \):
\[
d_{\text{attack}}^* = \left( z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)} \right)(x^{(\text{attack})})
\]
But then by the definition of \( p_{\text{attack}}^* \), \( p_{\text{attack}}^* \leq d_{\text{attack}}^* \), implying that the duality gap is zero, i.e \( p_{\text{attack}}^* = d_{\text{attack}}^* \).
This procedure leads to the Theorem 2.

C. Implementation Details

C.1. Computing the derivative of largest singular value

Our objective is to compute derivative of the largest singular value, i.e \( \|W^{(I)}\| \) with respect to \( W^{(I)} \). Let \( u^{(I)}, v^{(I)} \) be the singular vectors such that \( W^{(I)}v^{(I)} = \|W^{(I)}\|u^{(I)} \).
Then the derivative is given by:
\[
\nabla_{W^{(I)}} \|W^{(I)}\| = u^{(I)}(v^{(I)})^T
\]
\( \|W^{(I)}\|^2 \) can be computed by running power iteration on \( (W^{(I)})^TW^{(I)} \). \( u^{(I)} \) can be computed using the identity:
\[
u^{(I)} = \frac{W^{(I)}v^{(I)}}{\gamma^{(I)}}
\]
We use 25 iterations of the power method to compute the above quantities.

C.2. Update equation for the certificate problem

Our goal is to minimize \( \|x - x^{(0)}\| \) such that \( (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)})(x) = 0 \). We know that the Hessian satisfies the following LMI:
\[
mI \leq \nabla^2_x \left( z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)} \right) = MI \quad (4)
\]
\( K \) is given by Theorem 4 for neural network of any depth \((L \geq 2)\). For 2 layer networks, \( M \) and \( m \) are given by Theorem 3. But for deeper networks \((L \geq 3)\), \( M = K \), \( m = -K \). In either case, \( K \geq \max(|m|, |M|) \). Thus, we also have:
\[
-KI \leq \nabla^2_x \left( z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)} \right) \leq KI \quad (5)
\]
We will solve the dual \( (d_{\text{cert}}^*) \) of the attack problem \( (p_{\text{cert}}^*) \).
The primal problem \( (p_{\text{cert}}) \) is given by:
\[
p_{\text{cert}}^* = \min_{z_y^{(L)}(x) = z_i^{(L)}(x)} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 \right]
\]
\[
p_{\text{cert}}^* = \min_{x} \max_{\eta} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)})(x) \right]
\]
Using inequality (4) and Theorem 1 part (a), we know that the dual of the above problem is convex when \(-1/M \leq \eta \leq 1/m \).

The corresponding dual problem \( (d_{\text{cert}}^*) \) is given by:
\[
d_{\text{cert}}^* = \max_{-1/M \leq \eta \leq 1/m} \min_{x} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)})(x) \right]
\]
For a given \( \eta \), we have the following optimization:
\[
d_{\text{cert}}(\eta) = \min_{x} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)})(x) \right]
\]
We will use majorization-minimization to solve this optimization.
At a point \( x^{(k)} \), we aim to solve for the point \( x^{(k+1)} \) that decreases the objective function. Using the Taylor’s theorem at point \( x^{(k)} \), we have:
\[
(z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)})(x) = (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)})(x^{(k)}) + (g^{(k)})^T(x - x^{(k)}) + \frac{1}{2} (x - x^{(k)})^T H^{(k)}(x - x^{(k)})
\]
where \( g^{(k)} \) is the gradient of \( (z_y^{(L)} - z_i^{(L)}) \) at \( x^{(k)} \) and \( H^{(k)} \) is the Hessian at a point \( \xi \) on the line connecting \( x \) and \( x^{(k)} \).
Multiplying both sides by \( \eta \), we get the following equation:

\[
\eta \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x) \\
= \eta \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x^{(k)}) + \eta \left( g(k) \right)^T (x - x^{(k)}) \\
+ \frac{\eta}{2} (x - x^{(k)})^T H(k) (x - x^{(k)})
\]

(6)

Using inequality (5), we know that\(-K I \leq H(k) \leq K I \quad \forall \xi \in \mathbb{R}^D\),

\[
\frac{\eta}{2} (x - x^{(k)})^T H(k) (x - x^{(k)}) \leq \frac{\eta |K|}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2
\]

(7)

Using equation (6) and inequality (7):

\[
\eta \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x) \\
\leq \left[ \eta \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x^{(k)}) + \eta \left( g(k) \right)^T (x - x^{(k)}) \\
+ \frac{\eta |K|}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2 \right]
\]

Adding \( \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 \) to both sides, we get the following inequality:

\[
\frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x) \\
\leq \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x^{(k)}) \\
+ \eta \left( g(k) \right)^T (x - x^{(k)}) + \frac{\eta |K|}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2 \right]
\]

LHS is the objective function of \( d_{cerr}(\eta) \) and RHS is an upper bound. In majorization-minimization, we minimize an upper bound on the objective function. Thus we set the gradient of RHS with respect to \( x \) to zero and solve for \( x \):

\[
\nabla_x \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x^{(k)}) \\
+ \eta \left( g(k) \right)^T (x - x^{(k)}) + \frac{\eta |K|}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2 \right] = 0
\]

\[
(x - x^{(0)}) + \eta g(k) + |K| (x - x^{(k)}) = 0
\]

\[
(1 + |K|) x - x^{(0)} + \eta g(k) - |K| x^{(k)} = 0
\]

\[
x = -(1 + |K|)^{-1} (\eta g(k) - |K| x^{(k)} - x^{(0)})
\]

This gives the following iterative equation:

\[
x^{(k+1)} = -(1 + |K|)^{-1} (\eta g(k) - |K| x^{(k)} - x^{(0)})
\]

(8)

C.3. Update equation for the attack problem

Our goal is to minimize \( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \) within an \( l_2 \) ball of
radius of \( \rho \). We know that the Hessian satisfies the following LMIs:

\[
mI \preceq \nabla_x \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) \preceq MI
\]

(9)

\( K \) is given by Theorem 4 for neural network of any depth \((L \geq 2)\). For 2 layer networks, \( M \) and \( m \) are given by Theorem 3. But for deeper networks \((L \geq 3)\), \( M = K, m = -K \). In either case, \( K \geq \max(|m|, |M|) \). Thus, we also have:

\[
-KI \preceq \nabla_x \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) \preceq KI
\]

(10)

We solve the dual \( (d^*_\text{attack}) \) of the attack problem \((p^*_\text{attack})\) for the given radius \( \rho \).

The primal problem \((p^*_\text{attack})\) is given by:

\[
p^*_\text{attack} = \min_{\|x-x^{(0)}\| \leq \rho} z_y(L) - z_i(L)
\]

\[
p^*_\text{attack} = \min_{\eta \geq 0} \max_{\eta \leq m} \left[ z_y(L) - z_i(L) + \eta \left( \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right) \right]
\]

Using inequality (9) and Theorem 2 part (a), we know that the dual of the above problem is convex when \(-m \leq \eta \).

The corresponding dual problem \( (d^*_\text{attack}) \) is given by:

\[
d^*_\text{attack} = \max_{\eta \geq -m} d_\text{attack}(\eta)
\]

where \( d_\text{attack}(\eta) \) is given as follows:

\[
d_\text{attack}(\eta) = \min_x \left[ z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right] (x) \\
+ \frac{\eta}{2} \left( \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right)
\]

For a given \( \eta \), we have the following optimization:

\[
d_\text{attack}(\eta) = \min_x \left[ z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right] (x) \\
+ \frac{\eta}{2} \left( \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right)
\]

We will use majorization-minimization to solve this optimization.

At a point \( x^{(k)} \), we have to solve for the point \( x^{(k+1)} \) that decreases the objective function. Using the Taylor’s theorem at point \( x^{(k)} \), we have:

\[
\left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x) \\
= \left( z_y(L) - z_i(L) \right) (x^{(k)}) + \left( g(k) \right)^T \left( x - x^{(k)} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( x - x^{(k)} \right)^T H(k) \left( x - x^{(k)} \right)
\]

(11)
where \( g^{(k)} \) is the gradient of \( (z^L_y - z^L_t) \) at \( x^{(k)} \) and \( H(\xi) \) is the Hessian at a point \( \xi \) on the line connecting \( x \) and \( x^{(k)} \).

Using inequality (10), we know that \(-K I \leq H(\xi) \leq KI\) for all \( \xi \in \mathbb{R}^D\),

\[
\frac{1}{2} (x - x^{(k)})^T H(\xi) (x - x^{(k)}) \leq \frac{K}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2
\] (12)

Using equation (11) and inequality (12):

\[
\begin{aligned}
(z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})(x) &\leq \left[ (z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})(x^{(k)}) + (g^{(k)})^T (x - x^{(k)}) \right. \\
&\left. + \frac{K}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2 + \frac{\eta}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right]
\end{aligned}
\]

Adding \( \eta/2 (\|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2) \) to both sides, we get the following inequality:

\[
\begin{aligned}
(z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})(x) + \frac{\eta}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 &\leq \left[ (z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})(x^{(k)}) + (g^{(k)})^T (x - x^{(k)}) \right. \\
&\left. + \frac{K}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2 + \frac{\eta}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right]
\end{aligned}
\]

LHS is the objective function of \( d_{\text{attack}}(\eta) \) and RHS is an upper bound. In majorization-minimization, we minimize an upper bound on the objective function. Thus we set the gradient of RHS with respect to \( x \) to zero and solve for \( x \):

\[
\begin{aligned}
\nabla_x \left[ (z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})(x^{(k)}) + (g^{(k)})^T (x - x^{(k)}) \right. \\
&\left. + \frac{K}{2} \|x - x^{(k)}\|^2 + \frac{\eta}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 - \rho^2 \right] = 0
\end{aligned}
\]

Rearranging the above equation, we get:

\[
\begin{aligned}
g^{(k)} + K (x - x^{(k)}) + \eta (x - x^{(0)}) &= 0 \\
(K + \eta)x + g^{(k)} - K x^{(k)} - \eta x^{(0)} &= 0 \\
x &= -(K + \eta)^{-1} (g^{(k)} - K x^{(k)} - \eta x^{(0)})
\end{aligned}
\]

This gives the following iterative equation:

\[
x^{(k+1)} = -(K + \eta)^{-1} (g^{(k)} - K x^{(k)} - \eta x^{(0)})
\] (13)

**C.4. Algorithm to compute the certificate**

We start with the following initial values of \( x, \eta, \eta_{\min}, \eta_{\max} \):

\[
\eta_{\min} = -1/M, \quad \eta_{\max} = -1/m \\
\eta = \frac{1}{2}(\eta_{\min} + \eta_{\max}), \quad x = x^{(0)}
\]

To solve the dual for a given value of \( \eta \), we run 20 iterations of the following update (derived in Appendix C.2):

\[
x^{(k+1)} = -(1 + |\eta K|)^{-1} (\eta g^{(k)} - |\eta K| x^{(k)} - x^{(0)})
\]

To maximize the dual \( d_{\text{cert}}(\eta) \) over \( \eta \) in the range \([-1/M, -1/m]\), we use a bisection method: If the solution \( x \) for a given value of \( \eta, (z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})(x) > 0 \), set \( \eta_{\min} = \eta \), else set \( \eta_{\max} = \eta \). Set the new \( \eta = (\eta_{\min} + \eta_{\max})/2 \) and repeat. The maximum number of updates to \( \eta \) are set to 30. This method satisfied linear convergence. The routine to compute the certificate example is given in Algorithm 1.

**Algorithm 1 Certificate optimization**

**Require:** input \( x^{(0)} \), label \( y \), target \( t \)

\[
m, M, K \leftarrow \text{compute_bounds}(z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})
\]

\[
\eta_{\min} \leftarrow -1/M \\
\eta_{\max} \leftarrow -1/m \\
\eta \leftarrow 1/(\eta_{\min} + \eta_{\max})
\]

\[
x \leftarrow x^{(0)}
\]

for \( i \) in \([1, \ldots, 30]\) do

\[
\text{for } j \text{ in } [1, \ldots, 20] \text{ do}
\]

\[
g \leftarrow \text{compute_gradient}(z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)}, x)
\]

if \( |\eta g + (x - x^{(0)})| < 10^{-3} \) then

break

end if

if \( (z_y^{(L)} - z_t^{(L)})(x) > 0 \) then

\[
\eta_{\min} \leftarrow \eta
\]

else

\[
\eta_{\max} \leftarrow \eta
\]

end if

\[
\eta \leftarrow (\eta_{\min} + \eta_{\max})/2
\]

end for

return \( x \)

**C.5. Algorithm to compute the attack**

We start with the following initial values of \( x, \eta, \eta_{\min}, \eta_{\max} \):

\[
\eta_{\min} = -m, \quad \eta_{\max} = 20(1 - m) \\
\eta = \frac{1}{2}(\eta_{\min} + \eta_{\max}), \quad x = x^{(0)}
\]

To solve the dual for a given value of \( \eta \), we run 20 iterations of the following update (derived in Appendix C.3):

\[
x^{(k+1)} = -(K + \eta)^{-1} (g^{(k)} - K x^{(k)} - \eta x^{(0)})
\]

To maximize the dual \( d_{\text{cert}}(\eta) \) over \( \eta \) in the range \([-m, 20(1 - m)]\), we use a bisection method: If the solution \( x \) for a given value of \( \eta, |x - x^{(0)}| \leq \rho \), set \( \eta_{\max} = \eta \),


else set $\eta_{\text{min}} = \eta$. Set new $\eta = (\eta_{\text{min}} + \eta_{\text{max}})/2$ and repeat.

The maximum number of updates to $\eta$ are set to 30. This method satisfied linear convergence. The routine to compute the attack example is given in Algorithm 2.

**Algorithm 2** Attack optimization

Require: input $x^{(0)}$, label $y$, target $t$, radius $\rho$

$m, M, K \leftarrow \text{compute_bounds}(z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t)$

$\eta_{\text{min}} \leftarrow -m$

$\eta_{\text{max}} \leftarrow 20(1 - m)$

$\eta \leftarrow 1/2(\eta_{\text{min}} + \eta_{\text{max}})$

$x \leftarrow x^{(0)}$

for $i$ in $[1, \ldots, 30]$ do

for $j$ in $[1, \ldots, 20]$ do

$g \leftarrow \text{compute_gradient}(z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t, x)$

if $\|g + \eta(x - x^{(0)})\| < 10^{-5}$ then

break

end if

$x \leftarrow -(K + \eta)^{-1}(g - Kx - \eta x^{(0)})$

end for

if $\|x - x^{(0)}\| < \rho$ then

$\eta_{\text{max}} \leftarrow \eta$

else

$\eta_{\text{min}} \leftarrow \eta$

end if

$\eta \leftarrow (\eta_{\text{min}} + \eta_{\text{max}})/2$

end for

return $x$

C.6. Computing certificate using local curvature bounds

To compute the robustness certificate in a local region around the input, we first compute the certificate using the global bounds on the curvature. Using the same certificate as the initial $l_2$ radius of the safe region, we can refine our certificate. Due to the reduction in curvature, this will surely increase the value of the certificate. We then use the new robustness certificate as the new $l_2$ radius of the safe region and repeat. We iterate over this process 5 times to compute the local version of our robustness certificate.

To ensure that the optimization trajectory does not escape the safe region, whenever the gradient descent step lies outside the “safe” region, we reduce the step size by a factor of two until it lies inside the region.

D. Summary Table comparing out certification method against existing methods

Table 1 provides a summary table comparing our certification method against the existing methods.

E. Proofs

E.1. Proof of Theorem 1

(a)

$$d_{\text{cert}}(\eta) = \min_x \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta (z^{(L)}_y(x) - z^{(L)}_t(x)) \right]$$

$$\nabla_x^2 \left[ \frac{1}{2} \|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta (z^{(L)}_y(x) - z^{(L)}_t(x)) \right] = I + \eta \nabla^2 z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t$$

We are given that the Hessian $\nabla^2 z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t$ satisfies the following LMIs:

$$mI \leq \nabla^2 z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t \leq MI \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^n$$

The eigenvalues of $I + \eta \nabla^2 z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t$ are bounded between:

$$(1 + \eta M, 1 + \eta m), \text{ if } \eta < 0$$

$$(1 + \eta m, 1 + \eta M), \text{ if } \eta > 0$$

We are given that $\eta$ satisfies the following inequalities where $m < 0, M > 0$ since $(z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t)$ is neither convex, nor concave as a function of $x$:

$$\frac{-1}{M} \leq \eta \leq \frac{-1}{m}, \quad m < 0, M > 0$$

We have the following inequalities:

$$1 + \eta M \geq 0, 1 + \eta m \geq 0$$

Thus, $I + \eta \nabla^2 z^{(L)}_y - z^{(L)}_t$ is a PSD matrix for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^D$ when $-1/M \leq \eta \leq -1/m$.

Thus $1/2\|x - x^{(0)}\|^2 + \eta (z^{(L)}_y(x) - z^{(L)}_t(x))$ is a convex function in $x$ and $d_{\text{cert}}(\eta)$ is a convex optimization problem.

(b) For every value of $\eta$, $d_{\text{cert}}(\eta)$ is a lower bound for $p^{(\text{cert})}$. Thus $d^*_{\text{cert}} = \max_{-1/M \leq \eta \leq -1/m} d_{\text{cert}}(\eta)$ is a lower bound for $p^{(\text{cert})}$, i.e:

$$d^*_{\text{cert}} \leq p^{(\text{cert})}$$

Let $\eta^{(\text{cert})}, x^{(\text{cert})}$ be the solution of the above dual optimization ($d^*_{\text{cert}}$) such that

$$z^{(L)}_y(x^{(\text{cert})}) = z^{(L)}_t(x^{(\text{cert})})$$
Table 1. Comparison of methods for providing provable robustness certification. Note that (Cohen et al., 2019) is a probabilistic certificate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Non-trivial bound</th>
<th>Multi-layer</th>
<th>Activation functions</th>
<th>Norm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Szegedy et al., 2014)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>$l_2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since we are given that $\|x^{(\text{attack})} - x^{(0)}\| = \rho$, we get the following equation for $d^*_\text{attack}$:

$$d^*_\text{attack} = (z_g(L) - z_t(L))(x^{(\text{attack})})$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)$$

Since $p^*_\text{attack}$ is given by the following equation:

$$p^*_\text{attack} = \min_{\|x-x^{(0)}\|\leq \rho} \left[ (z_g(L) - z_t(L))(x^{(\text{attack})}) \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)$$

Using equations (21) and (24), $p^*_\text{attack}$ is the minimum value of $(z_g(L) - z_t(L))(x^{(\text{attack})})$ for all $x$ such that $\|x-x^{(0)}\| \leq \rho$:

$$p^*_\text{attack} \leq (z_g(L) - z_t(L))(x^{(\text{attack})})$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)$$

From equation (23), we know that $d^*_\text{attack} = (z_g(L) - z_t(L))(x^{(\text{attack})})$. Thus, we get:

$$p^*_\text{attack} \leq d^*_\text{attack}$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)$$

Using equation (20) we have $d^*_\text{attack} \leq p^*_\text{attack}$ and using (26), $p^*_\text{attack} \leq d^*_\text{attack}$:

$$p^*_\text{attack} = d^*_\text{attack}$$

### E.3. Proof of Lemma 1

We have to prove that for an $L$ layer neural network, the hessian of the $i^{th}$ hidden unit in the $L^{th}$ layer with respect to the input $x$, i.e. $\nabla^2_x z_i(L)$, is given by the following formula:

$$\nabla^2_x z_i(L) = \sum_{i=1}^{L-1} (B^{(i)})^T \text{diag}(F^{(i)}(\sigma(z^{(i)})))B^{(i)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)$$

where $B^{(i)}$, $i \in [L]$ is a matrix of size $N_i \times D$ defined as follows:

$$B^{(i)} = \left[ \nabla x z_1^{(i)}, \nabla x z_2^{(i)}, \ldots, \nabla x z_{N_i}^{(i)} \right]^T$$  \hspace{1cm} (28)$$

and $F^{(L,i)}$, $i \in [L-1]$ is a matrix of size $N_L \times N_i$ defined as follows:

$$F^{(L,i)} = \left[ \nabla a^{(i)} z_1^{(L)}, \nabla a^{(i)} z_2^{(L)}, \ldots, \nabla a^{(i)} z_{N_L}^{(L)} \right]^T$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)$$

$\nabla^2_x z_i(L)$ can be written in terms of the activations of the previous layer using the following formula:

$$\nabla^2_x z_i(L) = \sum_{j=1}^{N_{i-1}} W_{i,j} \left( \nabla^2_x a_j^{(L-1)} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)$$

Using the chain rule of the Hessian and $a^{(i)} = \sigma(z^{(i)})$, we can write $\nabla^2_x a_j^{(L-1)}$ in terms of $\nabla x z_j^{(L-1)}$ and $\nabla^2 x z_j^{(L-1)}$ as the following:

$$\nabla^2_x a_j^{(L-1)} = \sigma''(z_j^{(L)}) \left( \nabla x z_j^{(L-1)} \right)^T \left( \nabla x z_j^{(L)} \right)^T$$ \hspace{1cm} (31)$$

Replacing $\nabla^2_x a_j^{(L-1)}$ using equation (31) into equation (30), we get:

$$\nabla^2_x z_i(L) = \sum_{j=1}^{N_{i-1}} W_{i,j} \sigma''(z_j^{(L)}) \left( \nabla x z_j^{(L-1)} \right)^T \left( \nabla x z_j^{(L)} \right)^T$$ \hspace{1cm} (32)$$

For each $i \in [2, L]$, $i \in N_i$, we define the matrix $A_i^{(i)}$ as the following:

$$A_i^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{N_{i-1}} W_{i,j} \sigma''(z_j^{(L)}) \left( \nabla x z_j^{(L-1)} \right)^T \left( \nabla x z_j^{(L)} \right)^T$$ \hspace{1cm} (33)$$

Substituting $A_i^{(i)}$ using equation (35) into equation (33), we get:

$$\nabla^2_x z_i(L) = A_i^{(i)} + \sum_{j=1}^{N_{i-1}} W_{i,j} \sigma'(z_j^{(L)}) \left( \nabla^2 x z_j^{(L-1)} \right)^T$$ \hspace{1cm} (34)$$

We first simplify the expression for $A_i^{(i)}$. Note that $A_i^{(i)}$ is a sum of symmetric rank one matrices $(\nabla x z_j^{(L-1)})(\nabla x z_j^{(L-1)})^T$ with the coefficient
\[ W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma'' \left( z_j^{(L-1)} \right) \] for each \( j \). We create a diagonal matrix of the coefficients and another matrix \( B^{(L-1)} \) such that each \( j \)th row of \( B^{(L-1)} \) is the vector \( \nabla_x z_j^{(L-1)} \). This leads to the following equation:

\[
A_i^{(L)} = \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma'' \left( z_j^{(L-1)} \right) \left( \nabla_x z_j^{(L-1)} \right)^T \nabla_x z_j^{(L-1)} = \left( B^{(L-1)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( W_i^{(L)} \right) \sigma'' \left( z^{(L-1)} \right) B^{(L-1)}
\]

(37)

\[ B^{(I)} \] where \( I \in [L] \) is a matrix of size \( N_I \times D \) defined as follows:

\[
B^{(I)} = \left[ \nabla_x z_1^{(I)}, \nabla_x z_2^{(I)}, \ldots, \nabla_x z_{N_I}^{(I)} \right]^T, \quad I \in [L]
\]

Thus \( B^{(I)} \) is the jacobian of \( z^{(I)} \) with respect to the input \( x \).

Using the chain rule of the gradient, we have the following properties of \( B^{(I)} \):

\[
B^{(1)} = W^{(1)} \quad \text{(38)}
\]

\[
B^{(I)} = W^{(I)} \text{diag} \left( \sigma' \left( z^{(I-1)} \right) \right) B^{(I-1)} \quad \text{(39)}
\]

Similarly, \( F^{(I,J)} \) where \( I \in [L], J \in [I-1] \) is a matrix of size \( N_I \times N_J \) defined as follows:

\[
F^{(I,J)} = \left[ \nabla_{a(j)} z_1^{(I)}, \nabla_{a(j)} z_2^{(I)}, \ldots, \nabla_{a(j)} z_{N_J}^{(I)} \right]^T
\]

Thus \( F^{(I,J)} \) is the jacobian of \( z^{(I)} \) with respect to the activations \( a^{(I)} \).

Using the chain rule of the gradient, we have the following properties for \( F^{(L,I)} \):

\[
F^{(L,L-1)} = W^{(L)} \quad \text{(40)}
\]

\[
F^{(L,L)} = W^{(L)} \text{diag} \left( \sigma' \left( z^{(L-1)} \right) \right) F^{(L-1,L)} \quad \text{(41)}
\]

Recall that in our notation: For a matrix \( E \), \( E_i \) denotes the column vector constructed by taking the transpose of the \( i \)th row of the matrix \( E \). Thus \( i \)th row of \( W^{(L)} \) is \( \left( W_i^{(L)} \right)^T \) and \( F^{(L,I)} \) is \( \left( F_i^{(L,I)} \right)^T \). Equating the \( i \)th rows in equation (41), we get:

\[
\left( F_i^{(L,I)} \right)^T = \left( W_i^{(L)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( \sigma' \left( z^{(L-1)} \right) \right) F^{(L-1,I)}
\]

Taking the transpose of both the sides and expressing the RHS as a summation, we get:

\[
F_i^{(L,I)} = \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma' \left( z_j^{(L-1)} \right) F_j^{(L-1,I)} \quad \text{(42)}
\]

Substituting \( W^{(L)} \) using equation (40) into equation (37), we get:

\[
A_i^{(L)} = \left( B^{(L-1)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( F_i^{(L,L-1)} \right) \sigma'' \left( z^{(L-1)} \right) B^{(L-1)}
\]

(43)

Substituting \( A_i^{(L)} \) using equation (43) into (36), we get:

\[
\nabla_x^2 z_i^{(L)} = \left[ \left( B^{(L-1)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( F_i^{(L,L-1)} \right) \sigma'' \left( z^{(L-1)} \right) B^{(L-1)} \right] + \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma' \left( z_j^{(L-1)} \right) \left( \nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L-1)} \right)
\]

(44)

Thus, equation (44) allows us to write the hessian of \( i \)th unit at layer \( L \), i.e. \( \nabla_x^2 z_i^{(L)} \) in terms of the hessian of \( j \)th unit at layer \( L-1 \), i.e. \( \nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L-1)} \).

We will prove the following using induction:

\[
\nabla_x^2 z_i^{(L)} = \sum_{l=1}^{L-1} \left( B^{(I)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( F_i^{(L,I)} \right) B^{(I)}
\]

(45)

Note that for \( L = 2, \nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L-1)} = 0, \forall j \in N_1 \). Thus using (44) we have:

\[
\nabla_x^2 z_i^{(2)} = \left( B^{(1)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( F_i^{(2,1)} \right) B^{(1)}
\]

Hence the induction hypothesis (45) is true for \( L = 2 \).

Now we will assume (45) is true for \( L-1 \). Thus we have:

\[
\nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L-1)} = \sum_{l=1}^{L-2} \left( B^{(I)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( F_j^{(L-1,I)} \right) B^{(I)}
\]

\[ \forall j \in N_{L-1} \]

(46)

We will prove the same for \( L \).

Using equation (44), we have:

\[
\nabla_x^2 z_i^{(L)} = \left( B^{(L-1)} \right)^T \text{diag} \left( F_i^{(L,L-1)} \right) \sigma'' \left( z^{(L-1)} \right) B^{(L-1)}
\]

\[ + \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma' \left( z_j^{(L-1)} \right) \left( \nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L-1)} \right) \]

In the next set of steps, we will be working with the second term of the above equation, i.e.:

\[ \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma' \left( z_j^{(L-1)} \right) \left( \nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L-1)} \right) \]
Substituting $\nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L-1)}$ using equation (46) we get:

$$\nabla_x^2 z_j^{(L)} = (B^{(L-1)})^T \text{diag}(F_i^{(L,L-1)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(L-1)}))B^{(L-1)}$$

$$+ \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma'(z_j^{(L-1)}) \left[ \sum_{l=1}^{L-2} (B^{(l)})^T \text{diag}(F_j^{(L-1,l)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(l)}))B^{(l)} \right]$$

(47)

Combining the two summations in the second term, we get:

$$\nabla_x^2 z_i^{(L)} = (B^{(L-1)})^T \text{diag}(F_i^{(L,L-1)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(L-1)}))B^{(L-1)}$$

$$+ \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} \sum_{l=1}^{L-2} \left[ W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma'(z_j^{(L-1)}) \left( (B^{(l)})^T \text{diag}(F_j^{(L-1,l)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(l)}))B^{(l)} \right) \right]$$

Exchanging the summation over $I$ and summation over $j$:

$$\nabla_x^2 z_i^{(L)} = (B^{(L-1)})^T \text{diag}(F_i^{(L,L-1)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(L-1)}))B^{(L-1)}$$

$$+ \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} \sum_{l=1}^{L-2} \left[ W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma'(z_j^{(L-1)}) \left( (B^{(l)})^T \text{diag}(F_j^{(L-1,l)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(l)}))B^{(l)} \right) \right]$$

(48)

Since $B^{(l)}$ is independent of $j$, we take it out of the summation over $j$:

$$\nabla_x^2 z_i^{(L)} = (B^{(L-1)})^T \text{diag}(F_i^{(L,L-1)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(L-1)}))B^{(L-1)}$$

$$+ \sum_{l=1}^{L-2} (B^{(l)})^T \text{diag} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{N_{L-1}} W_{i,j}^{(L)} \sigma'(z_j^{(L-1)}) \left( F_j^{(L-1,l)} \odot \sigma''(z^{(l)})) \right) B^{(l)} \right]$$

(49)

E.4. Proof of Theorem 3

Using Lemma 1, we have the following formula for $\nabla_x^2 (z_y^{(2)} - z_t^{(2)})$:

$$\nabla_x^2 (z_y^{(2)} - z_t^{(2)}) = (W^{(1)})^T \text{diag} \left( (W_y^{(2)} - W_t^{(2)}) \odot \sigma''(z^{(1)}) \right) W^{(1)}$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{N_{t}} (W_{y,i}^{(2)} - W_{t,i}^{(2)}) \sigma''(z^{(1)}) W_i^{(1)} W_i^{(1)^T}$$

(50)

We are also given that the activation function $\sigma$ satisfies the following property:

$$h_L \leq \sigma''(x) \leq h_U \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}$$

(51)

(a) We have to prove the following linear matrix inequalities (LMIs):

$$N \in \nabla_x^2 (z_y^{(2)} - z_t^{(2)}) \leq P \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}$$

(52)

where $P$ and $N$ are given as following:

$$P = \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} p_i \left( W_{y,i}^{(2)} - W_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) W_i^{(1)} W_i^{(1)^T}$$

$$N = \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} n_i \left( W_{y,i}^{(2)} - W_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) W_i^{(1)} W_i^{(1)^T}$$

(53)
We first prove: \( \mathbf{N} \leq \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \) \( \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \):

We substitute \( \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \) and \( \mathbf{N} \) from equations (48) and (52) respectively in \( \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) - \mathbf{N} \):

\[
\nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) - \mathbf{N} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} \left( \mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) \left( \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) - \mathbf{n}_i \right) \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T
\]

Thus \( \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) - \mathbf{N} \) is a weighted sum of symmetric rank one matrices i.e., \( \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T \) and it is PSD if and only if coefficient of each rank one matrix i.e., \( \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T \left( \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) - \mathbf{n}_i \right) \) is positive.

Using equations (49) and (53), we have the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \geq 0 \implies \mathbf{n}_i = h_{L} \\
& \implies \left( \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) - \mathbf{n}_i \right) \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in [N_1], \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \\
(\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \leq 0 \implies \mathbf{n}_i = h_{U} \\
& \implies \left( \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) - \mathbf{n}_i \right) \leq 0 \quad \forall i \in [N_1], \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D 
\end{align*}
\]

Putting the above results together we have:

\[
\left( \mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) \left( \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) - \mathbf{n}_i \right) \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in [N_1], \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \tag{54}
\]

Thus \( \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) - \mathbf{N} \) is a PSD matrix i.e:

\[
\nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) - \mathbf{N} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} \left( \mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) \left( \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) - \mathbf{n}_i \right) \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T
\]

\[
\implies \mathbf{N} \leq \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \quad \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \tag{55}
\]

Now we prove that \( \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \) \( \preceq \mathbf{P} \quad \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \):

We substitute \( \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \) and \( \mathbf{P} \) from equations (48) and (52) respectively in \( \mathbf{P} - \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \):

\[
\mathbf{P} - \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) = \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} \left( \mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) \left( \mathbf{p}_i - \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) \right) \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T
\]

Thus \( \mathbf{P} - \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \) is a weighted sum of symmetric rank one matrices i.e., \( \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T \) and it is PSD if and only if coefficient of each rank one matrix i.e., \( \left( \mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) \left( \mathbf{p}_i - \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) \right) \) is positive.

Using equations (49) and (53), we have the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \geq 0 \implies \mathbf{p}_i = h_{U} \\
& \implies \left( \mathbf{p}_i - \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) \right) \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in N_1, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \\
(\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \leq 0 \implies \mathbf{p}_i = h_{L} \\
& \implies \left( \mathbf{p}_i - \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) \right) \leq 0 \quad \forall i \in N_1, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D 
\end{align*}
\]

Putting the above results together we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \left( \mathbf{p}_i - \sigma'' (\mathbf{z}_{i}^{(1)}) \right) \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in N_1, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \tag{56}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus \( \mathbf{P} - \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \) is PSD matrix i.e:

\[
\mathbf{P} - \nabla_x^2 (\mathbf{z}_y^{(2)} - \mathbf{z}_t^{(2)}) \preceq \mathbf{P} \quad \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D \tag{57}
\]

Thus by proving the LMIs (55) and (57), we prove (50).

(b) We have to prove that if \( h_{U} \geq 0 \) and \( h_{L} \leq 0 \), \( \mathbf{P} \) is a PSD matrix, \( \mathbf{N} \) is a PSD matrix.

We are given \( h_{U} \geq 0, h_{L} \leq 0 \). Using equation (53), we have the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \geq 0 \implies \mathbf{p}_i = h_{U} \geq 0 \\
& \implies \mathbf{p}_i (\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) \geq 0 \\
(\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \leq 0 \implies \mathbf{p}_i = h_{L} \leq 0 \\
& \implies \mathbf{p}_i (\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) \geq 0 
\end{align*}
\]

Putting these results together we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{p}_i (\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) & \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in N_1 \tag{58}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus \( \mathbf{P} \) is a weighted sum of symmetric rank one matrices i.e., \( \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T \) and each coefficient \( \mathbf{p}_i (\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) \) is positive.

\[
\mathbf{P} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} \mathbf{p}_i (\mathbf{W}_{y,i}^{(2)} - \mathbf{W}_{t,i}^{(2)}) \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} (\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)})^T \geq 0 \tag{59}
\]

always positive using eq. (58)
Using equation (53), we have the following:

\[
(W_{y,i} - W_{t,i})^2 \geq 0 \implies n_i = h_L \leq 0
\]

\[
\implies n_i (W_{y,i} - W_{t,i})^2 \leq 0
\]

\[
(W_{y,i} - W_{t,i})^2 \leq 0 \implies n_i = h_U \geq 0
\]

\[
\implies n_i (W_{y,i} - W_{t,i})^2 \leq 0
\]

Putting these results together we have:

\[
N = \sum_{i=1}^{N} n_i (W_{y,i} - W_{t,i})^2 \leq 0 \quad \forall i \in \{N_1\}
\]

(59)

Thus P is a PSD and N is a NSD matrix if \(h_U \geq 0\) and \(h_L \leq 0\). 

(c) We have to prove the following global bounds on the eigenvalues of \(\nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2)\):

\[
mI \leq \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \leq M, \quad \text{where} \quad M = \max_{|v|=1} v^T P v, \quad m = \min_{|v|=1} v^T N v
\]

Since \(\nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \leq P \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D:\)

\[
v^T \left[ \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \right] v \leq v^T P v
\]

\[
\forall v \in \mathbb{R}^D, \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]

(60)

Let \(v^*, x^*\) be vectors such that:

\[
(v^*)^T \left[ \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \right] v^* = \max_{|v|=1} v^T P v
\]

Thus using inequality (60):

\[
(v^*)^T \left[ \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \right] v^* \leq \max_{|v|=1} v^T P v
\]

(61)

Since \(N \leq \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D:\)

\[
v^T N v \leq v^T \left[ \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \right] v
\]

\[
\forall v \in \mathbb{R}^D, \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]

(62)

Let \(v^*, x^*\) be vectors such that:

\[
(v^*)^T \left[ \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \right] v^* = \min_{|v|=1} v^T \left[ \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \right] v
\]

Thus using inequality (62):

\[
(v^*)^T \left[ \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \right] v^* \geq \min_{|v|=1} v^T N v
\]

(63)

Using the inequalities (61) and (63), we get:

\[
mI \leq \nabla_x^2 (z_y^2 - z_i^2) \leq M I
\]

where \(M = \max_{|v|=1} v^T P v, \quad m = \min_{|v|=1} v^T N v\)

E.5. Proof of Theorem 4

We are given that the activation function \(\sigma\) is such that \(\sigma, \sigma'\) are bounded, i.e:

\[
|\sigma'(x)| \leq g, \quad |\sigma''(x)| \leq h \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}
\]

(64)

We have to prove the following:

\[
\| \nabla_x^2 z_i \| \leq h \sum_{i=1}^{L-1} (r^{(j)})^2 \max \left( S_i^{(j)} \right) \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]

(65)

where \(S^{(L,j)}\) is a matrix of size \(N_L \times N_L\) defined as follows:

\[
S^{(L,j)} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
W^{(L)} & I = L - 1 \\
g |W^{(L)}| S^{(L-1,j)} & I \in [L - 2]
\end{array} \right.
\]

and \(r^{(j)}\) is a scalar defined as follows:

\[
r^{(j)} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
|W^{(L)}| & I = 1 \\
g |W^{(L)}| r^{(j-1)} & I \in [2, L - 1]
\end{array} \right.
\]

(66)

We will prove the same in 3 steps.  
In step (a), we will prove:

\[
\| F_{i,j} \| \leq S_{i,j} \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]

(67)

In step (b), we will prove:

\[
\| B^{(j)} \| \leq r^{(j)}, \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]

(68)

In step (c), we will use (a) and (b) and prove:

\[
\| \nabla_x^2 z_i \| \leq h \sum_{i=1}^{L-1} (r^{(j)})^2 \max \left( S_i^{(j)} \right)
\]

(69)

Note that \(B^{(j)}\) and \(F^{(L,j)}\) are defined using (28) and (29) respectively.

(a) We have to prove that for \(L \geq 2, \quad I \in [L - 1], \quad j \in N_L, \quad i \in N_L, \quad j \in N_L:\)

\[
\| F_{i,j}^{(L,j)} \| \leq S_{i,j}^{(L,j)} \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]
where \( S^{(L-1)} \) is a matrix of size \( N_i \times N_j \) defined as follows:

\[
S^{(L-1)} = \begin{cases} 
\| W^{(L)} \| & I = L - 1 \smallskip 
\| g \| W^{(L)} \| S^{(L-1,j)} & I \in [L - 2] 
\end{cases}
\]

We first prove the case when \( I = L - 1 \).

Using equation (40), \( F^{(L-1)}_{i,j} = W_{i,j} \).

Since \( S^{(L-1)} \) is well-defined, we prove for \( L, I \;

Using the absolute value properties for equation (70),

\[
F^{(L-1)}_{i,j} = S^{(L-1)}_{i,j}
\]

Hence for \( L \geq 2, I = L - 1 \), we have equality in (67).

Hence proved.

Now, we will use proof by induction.

To prove the base case \( L = 2 \), note that \( I = L - 1 = 1 \) is the only possible value for \( I \). Thus, using the result for \( I = L - 1 \), the theorem holds for \( L = 2 \). This proves the base case.

Now we assume the induction hypothesis is true for depth \( L - 1, I \in [L - 2] \) and prove for depth \( L, I \in [L - 1] \). Since for \( I = L - 1 \), we have proven already, we prove for \( I \leq L - 2 \).

Using equation (42), we have the following formula for \( F_i^{(L-1)} \):

\[
F_i^{(L-1)} = \sum_{k=1}^{N_L} W^{(L)}_{i,k} \sigma'(z^{(L-1)}_k) F^{(L-1)}_{k,j}
\]

Taking the \( j \)-th element of the vectors on both sides:

\[
F_{i,j}^{(L-1)} = \sum_{k=1}^{N_L} W^{(L)}_{i,k} \sigma'(z^{(L-1)}_k) F^{(L-1)}_{k,j}
\] (70)

By induction hypothesis, we know that:

\[
\| F^{(L-1)}_{k,j} \| \leq S^{(L-1)}_{k,j}
\] (71)

Using the absolute value properties for equation (70), we have:

\[
\| F_i^{(L-1)} \| = \left\| \sum_{k=1}^{N_L} W^{(L)}_{i,k} \sigma'(z^{(L-1)}_k) F^{(L-1)}_{k,j} \right\|
\]

\[
\| F_i^{(L-1)} \| \leq \sum_{k=1}^{N_L} W^{(L)}_{i,k} \sigma(z^{(L-1)}_k) F^{(L-1)}_{k,j}
\]

\[
\| F_i^{(L-1)} \| \leq \sum_{k=1}^{N_L} W^{(L)}_{i,k} \sigma' \left( z^{(L-1)}_k \right) \| F^{(L-1)}_{k,j} \|
\]

Using \( \sigma'(x) \leq g \ \forall x \in \mathbb{R} \) (inequality (64)):

\[
\| F_i^{(L-1)} \| \leq g N_L \sum_{k=1}^{N_L} \| W^{(L)}_{i,k} \| \| F^{(L-1)}_{k,j} \|
\]

Using the induction hypothesis (inequality (71)):

\[
\| F_i^{(L-1)} \| \leq g N_L \sum_{k=1}^{N_L} \| W^{(L)}_{i,k} \| S^{(L-1)}_{k,j}
\]

Using equation (65) for definition of \( S^{(L-1)}_{i,j} \):

\[
F_i^{(L-1)} \leq S^{(L-1)}_{i,j}
\]

Hence we prove (67) for all \( L \geq 2 \) and \( I \leq L - 1 \) using induction.

(b) We have to prove that for \( 1 \leq I \leq M - 1 \):

\[
\| B(I) \| \leq r(I), \ \ \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D
\]

where \( r(I) \) is a scalar given as follows:

\[
r(I) = \begin{cases} 
\| W^{(1)} \| & I = 1 \\
\| g \| W^{(I)} \| r(I-1) & I \in [2, L - 1] 
\end{cases}
\]

Using equation (38), for \( I = 1 \) we have:

\[
\| B(1) \| = \| W(1) \| = r(1)\] (72)

Using equation (39), for \( I > 1 \), we have:

\[
\| B(I) \| = \| W(I) \| \text{diag} \left( \sigma' \left( z^{(I-1)}_1 \right) \right) B(I-1)\]

\[
\| B(I) \| \leq \| W(I) \| \| \text{diag} \left( \sigma' \left( z^{(I-1)}_1 \right) \right) \| B(I-1)\|
\]

Since \( \| \text{diag} \left( \sigma' \left( z^{(I-1)}_1 \right) \right) \| = \max_j | \sigma' (z^{(I-1)}_j) | \), using equation (64):

\[
\| B(I) \| \leq g \| W(I) \| B(I-1) \leq g \| W(I) \| r(I-1)\] (73)

Using inequalities (72) and (73), the proof follows using induction.

(c) We have to prove that:

\[
\| \nabla_x z_i^{(L)} \| \leq h \sum_{k=1}^{L-1} \left( r(I) \right)^2 \max_j (S^{(I)}) \]

Using Lemma 1, we have the following equation for \( \nabla_x z_i^{(L)} \):

\[
\nabla_x z_i^{(L)} = \sum_{I=1}^{L-1} \left( B(I) \right)^T \text{diag} \left( F_i^{(L-1)} \right) \sigma'' \left( z^{(I)} \right) B(I)^T
\]
Using the properties of norm we have:

\[ \| \nabla_{x} z_i^{(L)} \| \leq \sum_{i=1}^{L-1} \max_{j} \left( |F_{i,j}^{(L,i)}| \max_{j} \left( |\sigma''(z_j^{(l)})| \right) \right) \| B^{(l)} \|^2 \]

Since \( |F_{i,j}^{(L,i)}| \) and \( |\sigma''(z_j^{(l)})| \) are positive terms:

\[ \| \nabla_{x} z_i^{(L)} \| \leq \sum_{i=1}^{L-1} \max_{j} \left( |F_{i,j}^{(L,i)}| \right) \| B^{(l)} \|^2 \]

Using inequality (67):

\[ \| \nabla_{x} z_i^{(L)} \| \leq h \sum_{i=1}^{L-1} \max_{j} \left( S_{i,j}^{(l)} \right) \| B^{(l)} \|^2 \]

Using inequality (68):

\[ \| \nabla_{x} z_i^{(L)} \| \leq h \sum_{i=1}^{L-1} \left( r_i^{(l)} \right)^2 \max_{j} \left( S_{i,j}^{(l)} \right) \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^D \]

**Proof.**

\[ \nabla_u \hat{g}(u) = \frac{1}{(2\pi s^2)^{n/2}} \int_{\mathbb{R}^D} g(v) \frac{v - u}{s^2} \exp \left(-\frac{|v - u|^2}{2s^2}\right) dv \]

\[ \nabla_u^2 \hat{g}(u) = \frac{1}{(2\pi s^2)^{n/2}} \int_{\mathbb{R}^D} g(v) \frac{-I}{s^4} \exp \left(-\frac{|v - u|^2}{2s^2}\right) dv \]

Since \( 0 \leq g(v) \leq 1, -I/s^2 \leq 0, (v - u)(v - u)^T \geq 0 \) and \( \exp(x) \geq 0 \) \( \forall x \):

\[ \nabla_u^2 \hat{g}(u) = \frac{1}{(2\pi s^2)^{n/2}} \int_{\mathbb{R}^D} g(v) \left[ \begin{array}{c} \frac{v - u}{s^2} \exp \left(-\frac{|v - u|^2}{2s^2}\right) \end{array} \right] dv \]

**E.6. Proof of Theorem 1**

**Theorem 1.** For a binary classifier \( f \), let \( g \) denote the indicator function such that \( g(x) = 1 \iff f(x) > 0, g(x) = 0 \) otherwise. Let \( \hat{g} \) be the function constructed by applying randomized smoothing on \( g \) such that:

\[ \hat{g}(u) = \frac{1}{(2\pi s^2)^{n/2}} \int_{\mathbb{R}^D} g(v) \exp \left(-\frac{|v - u|^2}{2s^2}\right) dv \]

then the curvature of the resulting function \( \hat{g} \) is bounded i.e:

\[ -\frac{1}{s^2} \leq \nabla_u^2 \hat{g} \leq \frac{1}{s^2} \]

**F. Computing \( g, h, h_U \) and \( h_L \) for different activation functions**

**F.1. Softplus activation**

For softplus activation, we have the following. We use \( S(x) \) to denote sigmoid:

\[ \sigma(x) = \log(1 + \exp(x)) \]

\[ \sigma'(x) = S(x) \]

\[ \sigma''(x) = S(x)(1 - S(x)) \]
To bound \( S(x)(1 - S(x)) \), let \( \alpha \) denote \( S(x) \). We know that \( 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1 \):
\[
\alpha(1 - \alpha) = \frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{1}{2} - \alpha \right)^2
\]
Thus, \( S(x)(1 - S(x)) \) is maximum at \( S(x) = 1/2 \) and minimum at \( S(x) = 0 \) and \( S(x) = 1 \). The maximum value is 0.25 and minimum value is 0.
\[
0 \leq S(x)(1 - S(x)) \leq 0.25 \implies 0 \leq \sigma''(x) \leq 0.25
\]
Thus, \( h_U = 0.25 \), \( h_L = 0 \) (for use in Theorem 3) and \( g = 1 \), \( h = 0.25 \) (for use in Theorem 4).

F.2. Sigmoid activation

For sigmoid activation, we have the following. We use \( S(x) \) to denote sigmoid:
\[
\sigma(x) = S(x) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-x)}
\]
\[
\sigma'(x) = S(x)(1 - S(x))
\]
\[
\sigma''(x) = S(x)(1 - S(x))(1 - 2S(x))
\]
The second derivative of sigmoid (\( \sigma''(x) \)) can be bounded using standard differentiation. Let \( \alpha \) denote \( S(x) \). We know that \( 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1 \):
\[
h_L \leq \sigma''(x) \leq h_U
\]
\[
h_L = \min_{0 \leq \alpha \leq 1} \alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - 2\alpha)
\]
\[
h_U = \max_{0 \leq \alpha \leq 1} \alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - 2\alpha)
\]
To solve for both \( h_L \) and \( h_U \), we first differentiate \( \alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - 2\alpha) \) with respect to \( \alpha \):
\[
\nabla_\alpha \left( \alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - 2\alpha) \right) = \nabla_\alpha \left( 2\alpha^3 - 3\alpha^2 + \alpha \right)
\]
\[
= (6\alpha^2 - 6\alpha + 1)
\]
Solving for \( 6\alpha^2 - 6\alpha + 1 = 0 \), we get the solutions:
\[
\alpha = \frac{3 + \sqrt{3}}{6}, \frac{3 - \sqrt{3}}{6}
\]
Since both \( (3 + \sqrt{3})/6, (3 - \sqrt{3})/6 \) lie between 0 and 1, we check for the second derivatives:
\[
\nabla_\alpha^2 \left( \alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - 2\alpha) \right) = \nabla_\alpha \left( 6\alpha^2 - 6\alpha + 1 \right)
\]
\[
= 12\alpha - 6 = 6(2\alpha - 1)
\]
At \( \alpha = (3 + \sqrt{3})/6 \), \( \nabla_\alpha^2 = 6(2\alpha - 1) = 2\sqrt{3} > 0 \).
At \( \alpha = (3 - \sqrt{3})/6 \), \( \nabla_\alpha^2 = 6(2\alpha - 1) = -2\sqrt{3} < 0 \).
Thus \( \alpha = (3 + \sqrt{3})/6 \) is a local minima, \( \alpha = (3 - \sqrt{3})/6 \) is a local maxima.

Substituting the two critical points into \( \alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - 2\alpha) \), we get \( h_U = 9.623 \times 10^{-2}, h_L = -9.623 \times 10^{-2} \).
Thus, \( h_U = 9.623 \times 10^{-2}, h_L = -9.623 \times 10^{-2} \) (for use in Theorem 3) and \( g = 0.25, h = 0.09623 \) (for use in Theorem 4).

F.3. Tanh activation

For tanh activation, we have the following:
\[
\sigma(x) = \tanh(x) = \frac{\exp(x) - \exp(-x)}{\exp(x) + \exp(-x)}
\]
\[
\sigma'(x) = (1 - \tanh(x))(1 + \tanh(x))
\]
\[
\sigma''(x) = -2\tanh(x)(1 - \tanh(x))(1 + \tanh(x))
\]
The second derivative of tanh, i.e (\( \sigma''(x) \)) can be bounded using standard differentiation. Let \( \alpha \) denote \( \tanh(x) \). We know that \(-1 \leq \alpha \leq 1\):
\[
h_L \leq \sigma''(x) \leq h_U
\]
\[
h_L = \min_{0 \leq \alpha \leq 1} -2\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha)
\]
\[
h_U = \max_{0 \leq \alpha \leq 1} -2\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha)
\]
To solve for both \( h_L \) and \( h_U \), we first differentiate \(-2\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha)\) with respect to \( \alpha \):
\[
\nabla_\alpha \left( -2\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha) \right) = \nabla_\alpha \left( 2\alpha^3 - 2\alpha \right) = (6\alpha^2 - 2)
\]
Solving for \( 6\alpha^2 - 2 = 0 \), we get the solutions:
\[
\alpha = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}, \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}
\]
Since both \(-1/\sqrt{3}, 1/\sqrt{3}\) lie between -1 and 1, we check for the second derivatives:
\[
\nabla_\alpha^2 \left( -2\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha) \right) = \nabla_\alpha \left( 6\alpha^2 - 2 \right) = 12\alpha
\]
At \( \alpha = -1/\sqrt{3}, \nabla_\alpha^2 = 12\alpha = -4\sqrt{3} < 0 \).
At \( \alpha = 1/\sqrt{3}, \nabla_\alpha^2 = 12\alpha = 4\sqrt{3} > 0 \).
Thus \( \alpha = 1/\sqrt{3} \) is a local minima, \( \alpha = -1/\sqrt{3} \) is a local maxima.
Substituting the two critical points into \(-2\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 + \alpha)\), we get \( h_U = 0.76981, h_L = -0.76981 \).
Thus, \( h_U = 0.76981, h_L = -0.76981 \) (for use in Theorem 3) and \( g = 1, h = 0.76981 \) (for use in Theorem 4).

G. Quadratic bounds for two-layer ReLU networks

For a 2 layer network with ReLU activation, such that the input \( \mathbf{x} \) lies in the ball \( \| \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}^{(0)} \| \leq \rho \), we can compute the bounds over \( \mathbf{z}^{(1)} \) directly:
\[
\mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} \mathbf{x}^{(0)} + \mathbf{b}_i^{(1)} - \rho \| \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} \| \leq \mathbf{z}_i^{(1)}
\]
\[
\mathbf{z}_i^{(1)} \leq \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} \mathbf{x}^{(0)} + \mathbf{b}_i^{(1)} + \rho \| \mathbf{W}_i^{(1)} \| \]
Thus we can get a lower bound and upper bound for each $z_i^{(1)}$. We define $d_i$ and $u_i$ as the following:

$$d_i = W_i^{(1)}x^{(0)} + b_i^{(1)} - \rho \| W_i^{(1)} \|$$  \hspace{1cm} (74)

$$u_i = W_i^{(1)}x^{(0)} + b_i^{(1)} + \rho \| W_i^{(1)} \|$$  \hspace{1cm} (75)

We can derive the following quadratic lower and upper bounds for each $a_i^{(1)}$:

$$a_i^{(1)} \leq \begin{cases} 
\frac{-d_i}{(u_i - d_i)^2} z_i^{(1)} + \frac{u_i^2 + d_i^2}{(u_i - d_i)^2} z_i^{(1)^2} - \frac{u_i^2 d_i}{(u_i - d_i)^2} & \text{if } |d_i| \leq |u_i| \\
\frac{u_i}{(u_i - d_i)^2} z_i^{(1)} - \frac{2u_i d_i}{(u_i - d_i)^2} z_i^{(1)} + \frac{u_i^2 d_i^2}{(u_i - d_i)^2} & \text{if } |d_i| \geq |u_i| 
\end{cases}$$

$$a_i^{(1)} \geq \begin{cases} 
0 & |d_i| \leq |u_i| \\
\frac{1}{u_i - d_i} z_i^{(1)} - \frac{d_i}{u_i - d_i} z_i^{(1)} & |d_i| \geq 2|u_i| 
\end{cases}$$

The above steps are exactly the same as the quadratic upper and lower bounds used in (Zhang et al., 2018a).

Using the above two inequalities and the identity:

$$z_y^{(2)} - z_t^{(2)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( W_{y,i}^{(2)} - W_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) a_i^{(1)}$$

we can compute a quadratic lower bound for $z_y^{(2)} - z_t^{(2)}$ in terms of $z_i^{(1)}$ by taking the lower bound for $a_i^{(1)}$ when $\left( W_{y,i}^{(2)} - W_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) > 0$ and upper bound when $\left( W_{y,i}^{(2)} - W_{t,i}^{(2)} \right) \leq 0$. Furthermore since $z_i^{(1)} = W_i^{(1)}x + b_i^{(1)}$, we can express the resulting quadratic in terms of $x$.

Thus, we get the following quadratic function:

$$z_y^{(2)} - z_t^{(2)} \geq \frac{1}{2} x^T P x + q + r$$

The coefficients $P$, $q$ and $r$ can be determined using the above procedure. Note that unlike in (Zhang et al., 2018a), RHS can be a non-convex function.

Thus, it becomes an optimization problem where the goal is to minimize the distance $1/2 \| x - x^{(0)} \|^2$ subject to RHS (which is quadratic in $x$) being zero. That is both our objective and constraint are quadratic functions. In the optimization literature, this is called the S-procedure and is one of the few non-convex problems that can be solved efficiently (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004).

We start with two initial values called $\rho_{\text{low}}$ (initialized to 0) and $\rho_{\text{high}}$ (initialized to 5).

We start with an initial value of $\rho$, initialized at $1/2 (\rho_{\text{low}} + \rho_{\text{high}})$ to compute $d_i$ (eq. (74)) and $u_i$ (eq. (75)). If the final distance after solving the S-procedure is less than $\rho$, we set $\rho_{\text{low}} = \rho$. If the final distance is greater than $\rho$, we set $\rho_{\text{high}} = \rho$. Set new $\rho = 1/2 (\rho_{\text{low}} + \rho_{\text{high}})$. Repeat until convergence.

H. Additional experiments

Empirical accuracy means the fraction of test samples that were correctly classified after running a PGD attack (Madry et al., 2018) with an $l_2$ bound on the adversarial perturbations. Certified accuracy means the fraction of test samples that were classified correctly initially and had the robustness certificate greater than a pre-specified attack radius $\rho$. Unless otherwise specified, for both empirical and certified accuracy, we use $\rho = 0.5$. Unless otherwise specified, we use the class with the second largest logit as the attack target for the given input (i.e. the class $t$). Unless specified, the experiments were run on the MNIST dataset while noting that our results are scalable for more complex datasets. The notation $(L \times [1024], \text{activation})$ denotes a neural network with $L$ layers with the specified activation function, $(\gamma = c)$ denotes standard training with $\gamma$ set to $c$, $(\text{CRT}, c)$ denotes CRT training with $\gamma = c$. Certificates CROWN and CRC are computed over 150 correctly classified images.

H.1. Computing $K_{lb}$ and $K_{ub}$

First, note that $K$ does not depend on the input, but on network weights $W^{(1)}$, label $y$ and target $t$. Different images may still have different $K$ because label $y$ and target $t$ may be different.

To compute $K_{lb}$ in the table, first for each pair $y$ and $t$, we find the largest eigenvalue of the Hessian of all test images that have label $y$ and second largest logit of class $t$. Then we take the max of the largest eigenvalue across all test images. This gives a rough estimate of the largest curvature in the vicinity of test images with label $y$ and target $t$. We can directly take the mean across all such pairs to compute $K_{lb}$. However, we find that some pairs $y$ and $t$ were infrequent (with barely 1,2 test images in them). Thus, for all such pairs we cannot get a good estimate of the largest curvature in vicinity. We select all pairs $y$ and $t$ that have at least 100 images in them and compute $K_{lb}$ by taking the mean across all such pairs.

To compute $K_{ub}$ in the table, we compute $K$ for all pairs $y$ and $t$ that have at least 100 images, i.e at least 100 images should have label $y$ and target $t$. And then we compute the mean across all $K$ that satisfy this condition. This was done to do a fair comparison with $K_{lb}$. Figure 1 shows a plot of the $K_{ub}$ and $K_{lb}$ with increasing $\gamma$ for a sigmoid network (with 4 layers).
H.2. Comparison with provable defenses

In this section, we compare Curvature-based Robust Training (Ours) against state-of-the-art interval-bound propagation based adversarial training methods: COAP i.e Convex Outer Adversarial Polytope (Wong & Kolter, 2017) and CROWN-IBP (Zhang et al., 2019a) with different attack radius on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets. For CROWN-IBP, we vary the final beta parameter between 0.5 to 3 (using an interval of 0.1) and choose the model with best certified accuracy.

Table 2. Comparison with interval-bound propagation based adversarial training methods with attack radius $\rho = 0.5$ on MNIST dataset. Note that the certified accuracy of soflplus network with CROWN-IBP is significantly less than that of a similar ReLU network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Standard Accuracy</th>
<th>Certified Accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.69%</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>98.72%</td>
<td>89.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2× [1024], relu</td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>98.69%</td>
<td>91.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COAP</td>
<td>98.8%</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.56%</td>
<td>94.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>98.55%</td>
<td>88.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3× [1024], relu</td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>90.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COAP</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.43%</td>
<td>93.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>98.34%</td>
<td>87.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4× [1024], relu</td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>98.78%</td>
<td>90.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COAP</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Comparison with interval-bound propagation based adversarial training methods with attack radius $\rho = 0.5$ on Fashion-MNIST dataset.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Standard Accuracy</th>
<th>Certified Robust Accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>88.45%</td>
<td>78.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>86.21%</td>
<td>76.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>86.37%</td>
<td>75.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>86.03%</td>
<td>74.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Comparison with interval-bound propagation based adversarial training methods with attack radius $\rho = 1.58$ on MNIST dataset. We again observe that the certified accuracy of softplus network with CROWN-IBP is significantly less than that of a similar ReLU network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Standard Accuracy</th>
<th>Certified Robust Accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.68%</td>
<td>69.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>88.48%</td>
<td>42.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.26%</td>
<td>14.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>97.82%</td>
<td>50.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4× [1024], softplus</td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>97.43%</td>
<td>57.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN-IBP</td>
<td>96.58%</td>
<td>42.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second-Order Provable Defenses against Adversarial Attacks

Table 5. Comparison between CRT and Randomized Smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019). $s$ denotes the standard deviation for smoothing. We use $\rho = 0.5$. For CRT, we use $\gamma = 0.01$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Randomized Smoothing</th>
<th>CRT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$s = 0.25$</td>
<td>$s = 0.50$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2×[1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>93.75%</td>
<td>93.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2×[1024], tanh</td>
<td>94.61%</td>
<td>93.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3×[1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
<td>93.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3×[1024], tanh</td>
<td>94.69%</td>
<td>91.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4×[1024], sigmoid</td>
<td><strong>93.68%</strong></td>
<td>92.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4×[1024], tanh</td>
<td>93.57%</td>
<td>92.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H.3. Comparing Randomized Smoothing with CRT

Since, randomized smoothing is designed to work in untargeted attack settings while CRT is for targeted attacks, we make the following changes in randomized smoothing. First, we use $n_0 = 100$ initial samples to select the label class ($l$) and false target class ($t$). The samples for estimation were $n = 100,000$ and failure probability was $\alpha = 0.001$. Then we use the binary version of randomized smoothing for estimation, i.e. classify between $y$ and $t$. To find the adversarial example for adversarial training, we use the cross entropy loss for 2 classes ($y$ and $t$).

H.4. Additional experiments

Table 6. Table showing success rates ($\text{primal} = \text{dual}$) for different values of $\gamma$. Certificate success rate denotes the fraction of points ($x^{(0)}(0)$) satisfying $z_y - z_t = 0$. Attack success rate denotes the fraction of points ($x^{(0)}(attack)$) satisfying $\|x^{(attack)} - x^{(0)}\|_2 = \rho$ implying $\text{primal} = \text{dual}$ in Theorems 1 and 2 respectively. We observe that as we increase $\gamma$, the fraction of points satisfying $\text{primal} = \text{dual}$ increases for both the certificate and attack problems. This can be attributed to the curvature bound $K(W, y, t)$ becoming tight on increasing $\gamma$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
<th>Attack success rate</th>
<th>Certificate success rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2×[1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>98.77%</td>
<td>5.05%</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.57%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>98.59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>31.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>98.30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>44.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3×[1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>98.52%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.23%</td>
<td>44.86%</td>
<td>3.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>97.86%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>11.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>97.60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>22.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4×[1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>98.22%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>97.24%</td>
<td>24.42%</td>
<td>2.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>96.27%</td>
<td>44.42%</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>95.77%</td>
<td>99.97%</td>
<td>12.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>95.52%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>95.24%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>95.24%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19.53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Results for CIFAR-10 dataset (only curvature regularization, no CRT training)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Standard Accuracy</th>
<th>Empirical Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Certified Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Certificate (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>46.23%</td>
<td>37.82%</td>
<td>14.10%</td>
<td>0.37219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma = 0.01$</td>
<td>45.42%</td>
<td>38.17%</td>
<td>26.50%</td>
<td>0.40540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>48.57%</td>
<td>34.80%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.19127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma = 0.01$</td>
<td>50.31%</td>
<td>39.87%</td>
<td>18.28%</td>
<td>0.24778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>46.04%</td>
<td>34.38%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.19340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma = 0.01$</td>
<td>48.28%</td>
<td>40.10%</td>
<td>21.07%</td>
<td>0.29654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Comparison between CRT, PGD (Madry et al., 2018) and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b) for sigmoid and tanh networks. CRC outperforms CROWN significantly for 2 layer networks and when trained with our regularizer for deeper networks. CRT outperforms TRADES and PGD giving higher certified accuracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Standard Accuracy</th>
<th>Empirical Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Certified Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Certificate (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>PGD</td>
<td>98.80%</td>
<td>96.26%</td>
<td>93.37%</td>
<td>0.37595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRADES</td>
<td>98.87%</td>
<td>96.76%</td>
<td>95.13%</td>
<td>0.41358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.57%</td>
<td>96.28%</td>
<td><strong>95.59%</strong></td>
<td>0.43061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>PGD</td>
<td>98.76%</td>
<td>95.79%</td>
<td>84.11%</td>
<td>0.30833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRADES</td>
<td>98.63%</td>
<td>96.20%</td>
<td>93.72%</td>
<td>0.40601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.52%</td>
<td>95.90%</td>
<td><strong>95.00%</strong></td>
<td>0.37691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>PGD</td>
<td>98.84%</td>
<td>96.14%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.29632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRADES</td>
<td>98.95%</td>
<td>96.79%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.30576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.23%</td>
<td>95.70%</td>
<td><strong>94.99%</strong></td>
<td>0.39603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>PGD</td>
<td>98.78%</td>
<td>94.92%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.12706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRADES</td>
<td>98.16%</td>
<td>94.78%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.15875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>98.15%</td>
<td>95.00%</td>
<td><strong>94.16%</strong></td>
<td>0.28004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>PGD</td>
<td>98.84%</td>
<td>96.26%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.25444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRADES</td>
<td>98.76%</td>
<td>96.67%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.26128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>97.83%</td>
<td>94.65%</td>
<td><strong>93.41%</strong></td>
<td>0.40327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>PGD</td>
<td>98.53%</td>
<td>94.53%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.07439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRADES</td>
<td>97.08%</td>
<td>92.85%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.11889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>97.24%</td>
<td>93.05%</td>
<td><strong>91.37%</strong></td>
<td>0.33649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9. Comparison between CRC and CROWN-general (CROWN-Ada for relu) for different targets. For CRT training, we use $\gamma = 0.01$. We compare CRC with CROWN-general for different targets for 150 correctly classified images. Runner-up means class with second highest logit is considered as adversarial class. Random means any random class other than the label is considered adversarial. Least means class with smallest logit is adversarial. For 2-layer networks, CRC outperforms CROWN-general significantly even without adversarial training. For deeper networks (3 and 4 layers), CRC works better on networks that are trained with curvature regularization. Both CROWN and CRC are computed on CPU but the running time numbers mentioned here are not directly comparable because our CRC implementation uses a batch of images while the CROWN implementation uses a single image at a time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Certificate (mean)</th>
<th>Time per Image (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CROWN</td>
<td>CRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 × [1024], relu</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.50110</td>
<td>0.59166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.68506</td>
<td>0.83080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>least</td>
<td>0.86386</td>
<td>1.04883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 × [1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.28395</td>
<td>0.48500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.38501</td>
<td>0.69087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.43061</td>
<td>1.54673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.52847</td>
<td>1.99918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>least</td>
<td>0.62319</td>
<td>2.41047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 × [1024], tanh</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.23928</td>
<td>0.40047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.31281</td>
<td>0.52025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.37691</td>
<td>1.47016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.45896</td>
<td>1.87571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>least</td>
<td>0.52800</td>
<td>2.21704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 × [1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.24644</td>
<td>0.06874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.29496</td>
<td>0.08275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.39603</td>
<td>1.24100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.46808</td>
<td>1.54622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>least</td>
<td>0.51906</td>
<td>1.75916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 × [1024], tanh</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.08174</td>
<td>0.01169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.10012</td>
<td>0.01432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.12132</td>
<td>0.01757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.28004</td>
<td>1.14995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>least</td>
<td>0.32942</td>
<td>1.41032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.38023</td>
<td>1.65692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 × [1024], sigmoid</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.19501</td>
<td>0.00454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.21417</td>
<td>0.00542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.40327</td>
<td>1.06208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.47038</td>
<td>1.29095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>least</td>
<td>0.52249</td>
<td>1.49521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 × [1024], tanh</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.03554</td>
<td>0.00028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.04247</td>
<td>0.00036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRT, 0.01</td>
<td>runner-up</td>
<td>0.33649</td>
<td>0.93890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>random</td>
<td>0.41617</td>
<td>1.18956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>least</td>
<td>0.47778</td>
<td>1.41429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this table, we measure the effect of increasing $\gamma$, when the network is trained with CRT on standard, empirical, certified robust accuracy, $K_{lb}$ and $K_{ub}$ (defined in subsection H.1) for different depths (2, 3, 4 layer) and activations (sigmoid, tanh). We find that for all networks $\gamma = 0.01$ works best. We find that the lower bound, $K_{lb}$ increases (for $\gamma = 0$) for deeper networks suggesting that deep networks have higher curvature. Furthermore, for a given $\gamma$ (say 0.005), we find that the gap between $K_{ub}$ and $K_{lb}$ increases as we increase the depth suggesting that $K$ is not a tight bound for deeper networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>Standard Accuracy</th>
<th>Empirical Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Certified Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Curvature bound (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$K_{lb}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>98.77%</td>
<td>96.17%</td>
<td>95.04%</td>
<td>7.2031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>98.82%</td>
<td>96.33%</td>
<td>95.61%</td>
<td>3.8411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.57%</td>
<td>96.28%</td>
<td>95.59%</td>
<td>2.8196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>98.59%</td>
<td>95.97%</td>
<td>95.22%</td>
<td>2.2114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>98.30%</td>
<td>95.73%</td>
<td>94.94%</td>
<td>1.8501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>98.65%</td>
<td>95.48%</td>
<td>92.69%</td>
<td>12.8434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>98.71%</td>
<td>95.88%</td>
<td>94.76%</td>
<td>4.8116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.52%</td>
<td>95.90%</td>
<td><strong>95.00%</strong></td>
<td>3.4269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>98.35%</td>
<td>95.71%</td>
<td>94.77%</td>
<td>2.3943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>98.29%</td>
<td>95.39%</td>
<td>94.54%</td>
<td>1.9860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98.52%</td>
<td>90.26%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>19.2131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>98.41%</td>
<td>95.81%</td>
<td>94.91%</td>
<td>2.6249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.23%</td>
<td>95.70%</td>
<td><strong>94.99%</strong></td>
<td>1.9902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>97.99%</td>
<td>95.33%</td>
<td>94.64%</td>
<td>1.4903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>97.86%</td>
<td>94.98%</td>
<td>94.15%</td>
<td>1.2396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>97.73%</td>
<td>94.60%</td>
<td>93.88%</td>
<td>1.0886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>97.60%</td>
<td>94.45%</td>
<td>93.65%</td>
<td>0.9677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98.19%</td>
<td>86.38%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>133.7992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>98.41%</td>
<td>95.46%</td>
<td>93.01%</td>
<td>2.3461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.15%</td>
<td>95.00%</td>
<td><strong>94.16%</strong></td>
<td>2.2347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>97.84%</td>
<td>94.79%</td>
<td>94.05%</td>
<td>1.6556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>97.70%</td>
<td>94.19%</td>
<td>93.42%</td>
<td>1.3546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>97.57%</td>
<td>94.04%</td>
<td>92.95%</td>
<td>1.1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>97.31%</td>
<td>93.66%</td>
<td>92.65%</td>
<td>1.0354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98.22%</td>
<td>83.04%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>86.9974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.83%</td>
<td>94.65%</td>
<td><strong>93.41%</strong></td>
<td>1.6823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>97.33%</td>
<td>94.02%</td>
<td>92.94%</td>
<td>1.2089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>97.07%</td>
<td>93.52%</td>
<td>92.65%</td>
<td>1.0144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>96.70%</td>
<td>92.78%</td>
<td>91.95%</td>
<td>0.8840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>96.38%</td>
<td>92.29%</td>
<td>91.33%</td>
<td>0.7890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>96.08%</td>
<td>91.83%</td>
<td>90.67%</td>
<td>0.6614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97.45%</td>
<td>75.18%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>913.6984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>97.24%</td>
<td>93.05%</td>
<td><strong>91.37%</strong></td>
<td>1.9114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>96.82%</td>
<td>92.65%</td>
<td>91.35%</td>
<td>1.3882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>96.27%</td>
<td>91.43%</td>
<td>90.09%</td>
<td>1.1643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>95.62%</td>
<td>90.69%</td>
<td>89.41%</td>
<td>0.9620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>95.77%</td>
<td>90.69%</td>
<td>89.40%</td>
<td>0.9160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>95.24%</td>
<td>89.51%</td>
<td>87.91%</td>
<td>0.7540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11. In this table, we measure the impact of increasing curvature regularization ($\gamma$) on accuracy, empirical robust accuracy, certified robust accuracy, CROWN-general and CRC when the network is trained without any adversarial training. We find that adding a very small amount of curvature regularization has a minimal impact on the accuracy but significantly increases CRC. Increase in CROWN certificate is not of similar magnitude. Somewhat surprisingly, we observe that even without any adversarial training, we can get nontrivial certified accuracies of 84.73%, 88.66%, 89.61% on 2, 3, 4 layer sigmoid networks respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>Standard Accuracy</th>
<th>Empirical Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Certified Robust Accuracy</th>
<th>Certificate (mean)</th>
<th>CROWN</th>
<th>CRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>0.</td>
<td>98.37%</td>
<td>76.28%</td>
<td>54.17%</td>
<td>0.28395</td>
<td>0.48500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>97.96%</td>
<td>88.65%</td>
<td>82.68%</td>
<td>0.36125</td>
<td>0.83367</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>98.08%</td>
<td>88.82%</td>
<td>83.53%</td>
<td>0.32548</td>
<td>0.84719</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>97.88%</td>
<td>88.90%</td>
<td>83.68%</td>
<td>0.34744</td>
<td>0.86632</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>97.73%</td>
<td>89.28%</td>
<td>84.73%</td>
<td>0.35387</td>
<td>0.90490</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>98.34%</td>
<td>79.10%</td>
<td>14.42%</td>
<td>0.23938</td>
<td>0.40047</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>97.99%</td>
<td>90.17%</td>
<td>86.18%</td>
<td>0.28647</td>
<td>0.93819</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>97.64%</td>
<td>90.13%</td>
<td>86.40%</td>
<td>0.30075</td>
<td>0.99166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>97.52%</td>
<td>89.96%</td>
<td>86.22%</td>
<td>0.30614</td>
<td>0.98771</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>0.</td>
<td>98.37%</td>
<td>85.19%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.24644</td>
<td>0.06874</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>97.98%</td>
<td>91.93%</td>
<td>88.66%</td>
<td>0.38030</td>
<td>0.99044</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>97.71%</td>
<td>91.49%</td>
<td>88.33%</td>
<td>0.39799</td>
<td>1.07842</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
<td>91.34%</td>
<td>88.38%</td>
<td>0.39799</td>
<td>1.07842</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>97.16%</td>
<td>91.10%</td>
<td>88.63%</td>
<td>0.41015</td>
<td>1.15505</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>97.03%</td>
<td>90.96%</td>
<td>88.48%</td>
<td>0.42704</td>
<td>1.1807</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>96.76%</td>
<td>90.65%</td>
<td>88.30%</td>
<td>0.43884</td>
<td>1.19296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>97.91%</td>
<td>77.40%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.28196</td>
<td>0.95367</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>97.29%</td>
<td>90.98%</td>
<td>88.31%</td>
<td>0.31237</td>
<td>1.05915</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>97.04%</td>
<td>90.21%</td>
<td>87.77%</td>
<td>0.34091</td>
<td>1.08396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>96.88%</td>
<td>90.02%</td>
<td>87.52%</td>
<td>0.34148</td>
<td>1.11717</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>96.53%</td>
<td>89.61%</td>
<td>86.87%</td>
<td>0.36583</td>
<td>1.11307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>96.31%</td>
<td>89.25%</td>
<td>86.26%</td>
<td>0.38519</td>
<td>1.11689</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4 \times [1024]$, sigmoid</td>
<td>0.</td>
<td>98.39%</td>
<td>83.27%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.19501</td>
<td>0.00454</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>97.41%</td>
<td>91.71%</td>
<td>89.61%</td>
<td>0.28196</td>
<td>0.95367</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>96.47%</td>
<td>90.03%</td>
<td>87.77%</td>
<td>0.45074</td>
<td>1.14219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>96.24%</td>
<td>90.40%</td>
<td>88.14%</td>
<td>0.47961</td>
<td>1.3067</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>95.65%</td>
<td>89.61%</td>
<td>87.54%</td>
<td>0.49987</td>
<td>1.35129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>95.36%</td>
<td>89.10%</td>
<td>87.09%</td>
<td>0.51187</td>
<td>1.36064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>95.23%</td>
<td>88.03%</td>
<td>85.93%</td>
<td>0.54754</td>
<td>1.27948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4 \times [1024]$, tanh</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>97.65%</td>
<td>69.20%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.34778</td>
<td>0.97365</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>96.09%</td>
<td>88.79%</td>
<td>86.09%</td>
<td>0.41662</td>
<td>1.1086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>95.74%</td>
<td>88.36%</td>
<td>85.65%</td>
<td>0.44981</td>
<td>1.1740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>95.10%</td>
<td>87.50%</td>
<td>84.74%</td>
<td>0.48356</td>
<td>1.21957</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>95.14%</td>
<td>87.72%</td>
<td>84.77%</td>
<td>0.49113</td>
<td>1.25076</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>94.54%</td>
<td>86.67%</td>
<td>83.90%</td>
<td>0.49750</td>
<td>1.24198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second-Order Provable Defenses against Adversarial Attacks

References


